

Picking the Worms Out of the Routing Can

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Imagine a Perfect Internet



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- Everyone filters in/out routes
- BGP speakers are secured
- There are no route leaks

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- Everyone filters in/out routes
- BGP speakers are secured
- There are no route leaks
- (And only one AFI to worry about)

As we are not there, there is BCP194





- Published Feb 2015
- Recommendations for securing (e)BGP:
 - BGP Speaker
 - BGP Session
 - Route im/export and filters
- Common ground / BCP / 'your network your rules'
- Overall *very* reasonable recommendations
- But there are some issues...

Some worms...



"[...] any IXP member SHOULD make sure it has a route for the IXP LAN prefix [...] and that it announces the IXP LAN prefix [...] to its downstreams."

"The easiest way to implement this is for the IXP itself to take care of the origination of its prefix and advertise it to all IXP members through a BGP peering."

Some worms...




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"Tier 1 transit provider: an IP transit provider that can reach any network on the Internet without purchasing transit services."


Implications (i)



• Implications

- The IX will not do this if they do not want to


Implications (ii)



• Implications

- The IX's NOC will probably have a 'small discussion' with AS65536


Implications (iii)



• Implications

- The IX will not do this
- AS65536 would have to have broken filters to import these routes

Implications (iv)



• Implications

- The IX's NOC will probably have a 'small discussion' with AS65536
- Best practice filters should catch this


Some worms... that aren't really an issue.



- It was reasonable then, and operational practice shifted; Happens, things change, we can just ignore it
- IX operators can decide what *they* want
- While some creative interpretations can be difficult, nobody would try to force this, no? Like, by putting (not necessarily correct) assumptions on technology into laws and regulation.
- Still, it might be nice to update BCP194 to:
 - Be up-to-date with terms and technology
 - Iron out some of these smaller issues while we're at it



- Collect a compendium of everything that is there
- Align terminology with what is currently going on
- Describe an ideal world best-practice
 - Yes, also prescribe honoring GSHUT & not setting higher LPREF on IXPs; This was probably THE most requested addition
- A 55 page draft
- Q: "What is in there?"
A: "YES!"



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Generally Well Received



“I read it last night, and I didn’t hate it as much as I thought I would!”

- Anonymous IETF Attendee



“We therefore disagree with suggestions that testing should only occur within a provider’s own network because providers do not always control the portion of the network reaching the nearest designated IXP.”, DA 18-710, FCC, 2018.

- Current discussions revolve around requiring test servers to be located directly on the IXP fabric
- Policy making is not made for ingesting long technical documents
- Long technical documents are—by definition—not made to be timeless

“I came here to drink milk ...



- ... and regulate the Internet; And I am all out of milk.”
- The FCC is currently looking at regulating BGP security:
<https://manrs.org/2024/05/fcc-bgp-regulation-recap/>
<https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-402609A1.pdf>
- The FCC seems to have taken a rather informed approach this time around
- If the cool kids (here: FCC) have a fancy new toy^Wregulation, European regulators will want it, too
- Do you necessarily trust European regulators to always make technically well informed decisions?

Things being regulated more strictly...



- National Security
 - Computer Security
 - Critical Infrastructure
 - Communication Services

Things being regulated more strictly...



- National Security
 - Computer Security
 - Critical Infrastructure
 - Communication Services
- ISPs and IXPs are all of the above
- Policy makers need guidelines/documents to refer to
 - When is an entity 'doing good enough'?
 - What is the minimum to expect?
 - "At least follow best current practices!"

The BCP194 we need



- Short enough for policy makers to read and find actionable
- Testable enough to be referable in regulation
- Timeless (=technology agnostic) enough so it does not start falling on our feet without constant maintenance



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- Brief; Likely around 4 pages
 - Make sure no funny packets get to your BGP speakers
 - Make sure nobody meddles with your BGP sessions
 - Do not import anything you shouldn't
 - Do not export anything you shouldn't
 - Do not meddle with things not meant for you
- No specific technology or techniques
- No extensive terminology definitions
- Can be more authoritative due to higher-level guidelines

What got cut...




- There is extensive technical description and terminology documentation left over from -01
- Plan:
 - Create an *informational* 'available things and methods' draft
 - Easier to update
 - Not prescriptive -> Less arguments about what should (not) go in
 - Repository, not policy; Could have a best-before-date
 - Create an *informational* 'terms currently in use' draft
 - Will need constant updates anyway
 - Language differs per BGP application

What to take away



- Please provide feedback on the current state of the draft:
<https://github.com/ichdasich/draft-ietf-grow-bgpopensecupd>
- Talk to policy makers
 - They appreciate help contextualizing technical documents
 - The CONNECT WG is just right there ;-)
- Technical documents may get unexpected audiences



Draft Repo