RIPE 88, Kraków 20-24 May 2024



Architecture and Routing in a Geopolitical World

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
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council

What does the Internet look like?

Approaches to visualisation

- AS core [1]
- Hosted content [2]
- Connectivity map [3]

But why should we care?



Objective: Utopian Internet



...a border-free, settlement-free, transparent, uncensored Internet?

Context: Local & Global Internet Governance

Internet Sovereignty

"the right of a state to govern its networks to serve national interests" [1]

NETmundail+10

"[Working] to create the networked global governance architecture that is human-centric, inclusive, environmentally friendly, and development-oriented, as the networked society demands." [2]

Context: Regulatory Intervention

- Content
- Platform
- Network



What is the Impact?

Does the topology differ between countries?

How does the topology differ between countries?

Why does the topology differ between countries?

InternetMapping (Private)				
			<> Code -	
JerichoFalls Update primary cli for refact				

Readme Activity 0 stars 1 watching 0 forks

Our Work

The Internet Mapping Project

The Internet Mapping Project

Part of the <u>Secure Network Communication Across the Internet</u> Research Project by the <u>Cyber Security and Privacy</u> and <u>Real-Time and Distributed Systems</u> Research Groups from the <u>Department of Computer Science</u> at the University of York

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About The Project

We think that political constraints have prevented improvement in Internet routing protocols. Alternatives to BGP routing exist, but have not been widely adopted, potentially because of political considerations, government policies or limited industrial motivation. We're currently investigating Internet governance, the emergence of state sovereignty within the Internet, and understanding key Internet stakeholders and holders of power. A new tool to create metadata-rich Internet topology graphs at higher completeness systronlab.github.io/projects/internet-mapping

Releasing source code next week.


1. Our Approach

Observing the Internet



System Architecture

- Route Collectors RIPE RIS, RouteViews, PCH
- Metadata and Probes RIPEstat, RIPE Atlas, GeoLite2
- Data Processing
- Graph output



Capturing Location

• Internet Registry

RIPEstat, pulling data from ARIN, LACNIC, RIPE NCC, AFRINIC, APNIC

• Prefix Geolocation

MaxMind GeoLite2 City



Adding Metadata

Registered Owner

Processed into a usable format and sibling ASes (same owner) detected (using orgName, orgld, opaqueld, PeeringDB)

• Registered Location (country)

• State Ownership Data

Using state_owned_as dataset to identify majority state-owned ASes

Output

• Node

AS with metadata (owner, registered location, geolocation, etc)

• Edge

Adjacency between ASes



2. The Internet in 2024


Our Snapshot: 1 May 2024

Our Topology

84,266 ASes
(72% of NRO assignments)


Comparisons

- 116,977 NRO assignments
- 84,042 ASes seen in RIS



Maximum Degree


CCDF plot of the maximum degree of an AS combined with its probability (log-log scale)



Maximum Degree

Decrease in Medium-Degree Between 2023 and 2024, the volume of nodes in the mid-degree range reduces.


Increase in High-Degree The number of the highest degree nodes grows.



Maximum Degree & RPKI


CCDF plot of ASes:

- with an RPKI deployment (at least one ROA object)
- without an RPKI deployment



Average Neighbour Degree


CCDF plot of the average degree in a node's neighbourhood (e.g. the average degree of all nodes directly connected to a node)



Most Influential*

Ranking the most eigencentral ASes within the topology.

• How well-connected is a node, also considering its field of neighbours?




ASes and Peerings

The number of ASes (registered or observed) has increased by 411%

The number of (public) interconnections has increased 1,119%

Average path length has **increased from 3.7 to 12**.





United States	Germany	
Brazil	Poland	
Russia	United Kingdom	
China	Indonesia	
India	Ukraine	

The Internet, May 2024



Foreign Neighbours



Unique Upstream Neighbours

Where X is a country of interest, N the Internet's ASes, and K the ASes within X:

 $K = \{k \in N \mid country(k) = X\}$

Where I is the neighbours:

 $I = \{i \in N \mid \exists k \in K : i \in neighbours(k)\}$


Where I_0 is the set of first-degree neighbours of country X, the sets $I_1 \rightarrow I_d$ where $d \in \mathbb{N}$:

 $I_1 = \{ f \in N \mid \exists i \in I_0 : f \in neighbours(i) \} \setminus I_0$

Or more generally:

 $I_{d} = \{ f \in N \mid \exists i \in I_{d-1} : f \in neighbours(i) \} \setminus (I_{d-1} \cup \ldots \cup I_{d-q}) : q \in \mathbb{N} \land d > 0 \land d - q \ge 0$

Unique Upstream Neighbours



Visualising Connectivity

Using Kamada & Kawai (1987)

Greater distance


Lesser importance (likely to be T2/3)

Closer to the centre

Greater importance (more likely to be T1/2)


Iran

- 527 domestic ASes
- 57 foreign neighbours




Norway

- 282 domestic ASes
- 489 foreign neighbours



United Kingdom

- 2,115 domestic ASes
- 3,572 foreign neighbours



5. Censorship: a Why?

Detecting Censorship

Explicit Users are aware of censorship taking place.

Blockpages

Incorrect DNS resolution

Non-Explicit

Users are possibly not aware of censorship taking place.


HTTP failures

DNS, TCP, HTTP anomalies

Mitigation Also considering the ratio of 'normal' traffic.


Relative Upstream Change

Capturing the change in the number of ASes at each step from the 'border'.




Relative Upstream Change

A relationship starts to become apparent as the degree increases...



Cumulative Downstream Burden

Starting to see some connection (~0.5 correlation coefficient) between the downstream burden and censored traffic.




Funnelling

Based on the cumulative downstream burden, but weighted for network size.

Generally, higher censorship gives higher funnelling.

...with some exceptions (but remaining geopolitical)



Internet Censorship Effort

Summary

Internet topology fusion tool The volume of highest-degree ASes is growing... ...and the volume of lowest-degree is also growing Geopolitics has a statistically significant impact on topology structure

Questions & Contact





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