





# WHOIS Right? An Analysis of WHOIS and RDAP Consistency

**Simon Fernandez**, Olivier Hureau, Andrzej Duda and Maciej Korczyński May 21st, 2024 Outtille

Registration Information

Data Collection and Analysis

Results

Conclusion

# **Registration Information**

#### WHOIS and RDAP - Who?

When studying/blacklisting a domain, we may want to know:

- · Who sold it?
- Who bought it? (Did they buy other domains?)
- When? (Did they buy many in bulk?)
- Who to contact in case of abuse? (To take it down)

Registration Information

#### WHOIS and RDAP - Who?

When studying/blacklisting a domain, we may want to know:

- Who sold it?
- Who bought it? (Did they buy other domains?)
- When? (Did they buy many in bulk?)
- Who to contact in case of abuse? (To take it down)

Registration Information

We need Registration Information

#### **WHOIS**

- · Old protocol
- Insecure (unsigned & unencrypted)
- · Widely spread
- · Vague "Human readable" format

### WHOIS - Example

Domain Name: GOOGLE.COM

Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.markmonitor.com

Updated Date: 2019-09-09T15:39:04Z Creation Date: 1997-09-15T04:00:00Z

Registry Expiry Date: 2028-09-14T04:00:00Z

Registrar: MarkMonitor Inc.

Registrar IANA ID: 292

Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abusecomplaints@markmonitor.com

Name Server: NS1.GOOGLE.COM Name Server: NS2.GOOGLE.COM

Language used:

#### Language used:

NOMBRE DE DOMINIO: epson.com.bo

CONTACTO TECNICO

Razón social: Markmonitor

Nombre Completo: Markmonitor Tech

Correo electrónico: ccops@markmonitor.com

País: Estados Unidos de America

Ciudad: Boise

Dirección: 391 N. Ancestor pl.

Teléfono: 12083895740

Fecha de activación: 2001-08-17

Fecha de corte: 2024-08-17

Date format:

Date format:

Creation Date: 01-02-03

#### Date format:

Creation Date: 01-02-03

- · Febuary 3rd, 2001
- · Febuary 1st, 2003
- · March 2nd, 2002
- ...

## RDAP - Registration Data Access Protocol

In 2015, a new protocol is designed

- Using HTTP(S) for transport
- JSON data format
- Relatively well defined data types
- Not used by all TLDs

#### RDAP - Example


00000000


```
"ldhName": "GOOGLE.COM".
"links": [{"value": "https://rdap.markmonitor.com/rdap/domain/GOOGLE.COM"}],
["registrar"], "publicIds": [{"type": "IANA Registrar ID", "identifier": "292"}],
["abuse"], "vcardArray": ["email",{},"text","abusecomplaints@markmonitor.com"],
{"eventAction": "registration", "eventDate": "1997-09-15T04:00:00Z"},
{"eventAction": "expiration", "eventDate": "2028-09-14T04:00:00Z"},
{"eventAction": "last changed", "eventDate": "2019-09-09T15:39:04Z"},
{"objectClassName": "nameserver"."ldhName": "NS1.GOOGLE.COM"}.
{"objectClassName": "nameserver", "ldhName": "NS2.GOOGLE.COM"},
```


**RDAP** 

example.com

Registration Information












#### **WHOIS**


example.com






Registration Information 00000000







Multiple servers and records. Are they coherent?

# Data Collection and Analysis

· Start from a list of domains (CZDS, Passive DNS, Blacklists,...)

- · Start from a list of domains (CZDS, Passive DNS, Blacklists,...)
- Select 55M domains with both WHOIS & RDAP

- · Start from a list of domains (CZDS, Passive DNS, Blacklists,...)
- · Select 55M domains with both WHOIS & RDAP
- Collect all their records →164M records

- · Start from a list of domains (CZDS, Passive DNS, Blacklists,...)
- · Select 55M domains with both WHOIS & RDAP
- Collect all their records →164M records
- · Parse the contents

- · Start from a list of domains (CZDS, Passive DNS, Blacklists,...)
- · Select 55M domains with both WHOIS & RDAP
- Collect all their records →164M records
- Parse the contents
- · Check if the values are consistent

Fields used by other research works & present in most records

· Nameservers: Authoritative servers for the domain

Fields used by other research works & present in most records

- · Nameservers: Authoritative servers for the domain
- Creation & Expiration dates: When the domain appeared and will expire

Fields used by other research works & present in most records

- · Nameservers: Authoritative servers for the domain
- Creation & Expiration dates: When the domain appeared and will expire
- · IANA ID: Which registrar manages the domain

Fields used by other research works & present in most records

- · Nameservers: Authoritative servers for the domain
- Creation & Expiration dates: When the domain appeared and will expire
- · IANA ID: Which registrar manages the domain
- Emails: Support and abuse mail addresses

# Results



## **Inconsistencies**

Field	Data type   Missing rate		Domain inconsistency	
Nameservers	List(Text)	6.6%	573,790 (1%)	
IANA ID	Integer	13.7%	106,813 (0.2%)	
Creation date	Date	2.2%	3,138,024 (5.7%)	
Expiration date	Date	2.7%	2,424,951 (4.4%)	
Emails	List(Email)	14.8%	18,958,821 (34.5%)	



## **Inconsistencies**

Field Data type		Missing rate	Domain inconsistency	
Nameservers	List(Text)	6.6%	573,790 (1%)	
IANA ID	Integer	13.7%	106,813 (0.2%)	
Creation date	Date	2.2%	3,138,024 (5.7%)	
Expiration date	Date	2.7%	2,424,951 (4.4%)	
Emails	List(Email)	14.8%	18,958,821 (34.5%)	

Multiple nameservers per record. Multiple types of mismatches.

- · Inclusion: One set is a subset of the other
- · Intersection: Both sets have a nameserver in common
- · Disjoint: No common nameserver

Multiple nameservers per record. Multiple types of mismatches.

- · Inclusion: One set is a subset of the other
- · Intersection: Both sets have a nameserver in common
- · Disjoint: No common nameserver


Case	Domains	
All	576,204	
Inclusion	224,833 (39.1%)	
Intersection	23,934 (4.1%)	
Disjoint	343,994 (60.0%)	

Multiple nameservers per record. Multiple types of mismatches.


- · Inclusion: One set is a subset of the other
- · Intersection: Both sets have a nameserver in common
- · Disjoint: No common nameserver

Case	Domains		
All	576,204		
Inclusion	224,833 (39.1%)		
Intersection	23,934 (4.1%)		
Disjoint	343,994 (60.0%)		









Inconsistencies can be within the same protocol (25.1%) or between protocols (74.9%).

To check who is right, we need a ground truth. The DNS.

To check who is right, we need a ground truth. The DNS.

The DNS has a way to find the authoritative nameservers.

We collected 300k NS records.

To check who is right, we need a ground truth. The DNS.

The DNS has a way to find the authoritative nameservers.

We collected 300k NS records.

When records are disjoint:

WHOIS / RDAP

To check who is right, we need a ground truth. The DNS.

The DNS has a way to find the authoritative nameservers.

We collected 300k NS records.

When records are disjoint:

WHOIS / RDAP

21% / 78.5%

# Conclusion

· Registration information

- · Registration information
- Used by many researchers & security experts

- · Registration information
- Used by many researchers & security experts
- Different sources of information (servers, protocols,...)

- · Registration information
- Used by many researchers & security experts
- Different sources of information (servers, protocols,...)
- 164M records from 55M domains collected

- · Registration information
- Used by many researchers & security experts
- Different sources of information (servers, protocols,...)
- 164M records from 55M domains collected
- ~5% of domains are inconsistent

- · Registration information
- Used by many researchers & security experts
- Different sources of information (servers, protocols,...)
- 164M records from 55M domains collected
- ~5% of domains are inconsistent
- · No clear source of truth

- · Registration information
- Used by many researchers & security experts
- Different sources of information (servers, protocols,...)
- 164M records from 55M domains collected
- ~5% of domains are inconsistent
- · No clear source of truth
- · Should be used with care

# Sharing Dataset & Analysis

**Dataset:** Parsed WHOIS and RDAP entries & DNS Records



https://doi.org/10.57745/RJX9XH

**Code:** Inconsistencies detection & Statistical analysis



https://github.com/drakkar-lig/ whois-right-dataset

# **Sharing Dataset & Analysis**

**Dataset:** Parsed WHOIS and RDAP entries & DNS Records

**Code:** Inconsistencies detection & Statistical analysis



https://doi.org/10.57745/RJX9XH



https://github.com/drakkar-lig/
 whois-right-dataset

Thank you for your attention.

Questions?

25% of mismatches are Disjoint

With GDPR:

· Removed: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY

25% of mismatches are Disjoint

#### With GDPR:

· Removed: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY

• Proxied: 3ceacab70b131276@privacy.com

25% of mismatches are Disjoint

#### With GDPR:

- Removed: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
- Proxied: 3ceacab70b131276@privacy.com
- Specific: whois@domain.com & rdap@domain.com

25% of mismatches are Disjoint

#### With GDPR:

- Removed: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
- Proxied: 3ceacab70b131276@privacy.com
- Specific: whois@domain.com & rdap@domain.com

25% of mismatches are Disjoint

#### With GDPR:

- Removed: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
- Proxied: 3ceacab70b131276@privacy.com
- Specific: whois@domain.com & rdap@domain.com

local@domain.com

25% of mismatches are Disjoint

#### With GDPR:

- Removed: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
- Proxied: 3ceacab70b131276@privacy.com
- Specific: whois@domain.com & rdap@domain.com

local@domain.com

Disjoint down to ~10%. Resolves mismatches for ~20% of domains.