



**RIPE NCC**

RIPE NETWORK COORDINATION CENTRE

# RIPE NCC RPKI Operations Update

Tim Bruijnzeels | 22 May 2024 | RIPE 88

# A New UI?



- Why?
  - Improve sub-optimal processes: staging ROAs, alerts, etc
  - Improve maintainability
  - Add support for new RPKI object types more easily
- How?
  - UX interviews with users at RIPE 87
  - Implementation is happening right now!
  - Beta test starting soon! Volunteers wanted!

# For Example: Pending Changes



Review and apply ✕

Staged ROAs

Origin AS	Prefix	Max Length
AS2121	193.0.24.0/21	21

Affected announcements

Origin AS	Prefix	Current status	New status
AS2121	193.0.24.0/21	Unknown	Valid

Apply now    To pending changes

Review and apply ✕

Staged ROAs

Origin AS	Prefix	Max Length
AS2121	2001:67c:64::/48	48

Affected announcements

Origin AS	Prefix	Current status	New status
AS2121	2001:67c:64::/48	Unknown	Valid

Apply now is not available when you have pending changes

To pending changes


BGP Announcements: 2      ROAs: 2      Pending changes: 2

Staged ROAs

Origin AS	Prefix	Max Length	
AS2121	193.0.24.0/21	21	<input type="button" value="Edit"/> <input type="button" value="Discard"/>
AS2121	2001:67c:64::/48	48	<input type="button" value="Edit"/> <input type="button" value="Discard"/>

Affected Announcements

Origin AS	Prefix	Current State	Future State
AS2121	193.0.24.0/21	Unknown	Valid
AS2121	2001:67c:64::/48	Unknown	Valid



# Future Functionality



- New RPKI object types
  - ASPA (API/UI, pending IETF last call)
  - Resource Signed Checklists (API)
  - BGPsec router certificates (API)
- Faster BGP information
  - Current BGP information is up to eight hours old
- IRR integration
  - Automatically create route objects?

# ASPA... in one minute



- AS holders declare providers
  - Helps detect route leaks
  - Makes path spoofing attacks on ROV (much) harder
- More information
  - [RPKI Usability 2024](#) at [SEE12](#)
  - [Presentation](#) by Ben Maddison at AfPIF2023
  - [IETF verification draft](#) and [proof of correctness](#)
- Currently available in the test environment (API only)

# Hardware Security Modules (HSM)



- Used to keep private keys secure
- Replaced HSM hardware for the online system
- Replaced Trust Anchor laptop (using USB based HSM)

# ISAE3000



- Support auditors and InfoSec
- Formalise Business Continuity Plan
  - Clearly documented outage scenarios and mitigations
- Improved database backup strategy
  - Reduced data loss in case to <1 hour
- Updated Certification Practice Statement
  - In particular: improved description of the offline Trust Anchor signing sessions

# NRO RPKI Program



- Aimed at providing a **more consistent RPKI service for the global Internet community**
- Started in 2024
  - Sofía Silva Berenguer, RPKI Program Manager - NRO
  - Representatives of each RIR
  - Regular (online) meetings
- Read more
  - [https://labs.ripe.net/author/sofia\\_silva\\_berenguer/improving-rir-alignment-in-the-rpki-space/](https://labs.ripe.net/author/sofia_silva_berenguer/improving-rir-alignment-in-the-rpki-space/)
  - [https://www.nro.net/technical-coordination/security/certification/#rpki\\_program](https://www.nro.net/technical-coordination/security/certification/#rpki_program)



# NRO RPKI Program



- What are the **main barriers or obstacles** for RPKI adoption that could be solved (or at least improved!) through better **coordination and collaboration** among the RIRs?
- Do you have ideas of initiatives we should consider?
- Let us know!
  - Talk to us
  - Discuss in the routing working group
  - Or email Sofia directly at [rпки\\_program@nro.net](mailto:rпки_program@nro.net)

# NRO RPKI Program



- Key Objectives
  - Definition of what a single global RPKI system looks like
  - Better understanding and improved transparency of robustness
  - Enhanced security consistency
  - Engage with the global technical community
- Short term (2024)
  - Establish and document status quo at each RIR
  - Cooperate on proposals
  - Follow-up work items likely in 2025



# Questions



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